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Life is a continuous process of setting and striving for goals
(Kruglanski et al., 2000). Whether in the fields of health,
work, sports, or relationships, most human behaviour is, in
fact, assumed to be goal driven. However, goal pursuit is
not always free of complications; and coping with goal-
related obstacles, that is, aspects that stand in the way of a
goal that has been set (Oettingen et al., 2009), is regarded
as being a key prerequisite for successful goal attainment
(Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Marguc, Förster, & Van Kleef,
2011).
A great deal of research has emphasized the importance
of the way in which people cope with obstacles for their
self-regulatory success and, for example, stressed the benefits
of responding to obstacles strategically (Marguc et al., 2011),
persisting despite their presence (Moeller, Troop-Gordon, &
Robinson, 2015), and anticipating obstacles in the future
(e.g. Oettingen, 1997; Zhang & Fishbach, 2010). One funda-
mental aspect of self-regulation in the context of obstacles
that has been neglected so far is, however, the identification
of obstacles and specifically the question of antecedents that
turn an individual’s attention towards potential obstacles dur-
ing goal pursuit.
In the current research, we take a personality-
psychological perspective and focus on individual differ-
ences in self-awareness, the tendency of a person to become
the object of his or her own attention (Duval & Wicklund,
1972), as a potential antecedent of the identification of obsta-
cles. By investigating self-awareness in the context of daily
goal pursuit, we rely on literature emphasizing the impor-
tance of personality processes for investigating self-
regulatory processes (Hoyle, 2010).
Later, we will elaborate in more detail why self-
awareness should promote the identification of goal-related
obstacles and therefore play a crucial role in self-regulation.
We will do so by first explicating the importance of identify-
ing obstacles in the process of goal pursuit before turning to
the role of self-awareness in this process.
Identifying obstacles during goal pursuit
On the basis of propositions of the two-stage model of self-
control (Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009), we consider two se-
quential steps to be crucial for coping successfully with
goal-related obstacles: First, an individual needs to identify
whether a goal-related aspect is in conflict with the unob-
structed pursuit of his or her goal (conflict identification).
Such obstacles may come in the shape of physical, mental,
social, or situational hindrances (Marguc et al., 2011). What
is identified as an obstacle is furthermore highly idiosyn-
cratic: While one student may consider attending his or her
mum’s birthday party to be a problematic distraction that will
steal his or her study time, another looks at the social event as
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a source of support that will keep up his or her spirits while
preparing for exams.
Second, after identifying an obstacle as such, the indi-
vidual needs to invoke effective strategies to deal with
the conflict caused by the obstacle (conflict resolution).
The student may, for example, simply decline the invitation
to the party, decide to at least stay sober for the night, or
make up for the time lost by skipping sports training that
week. While both insufficient conflict identification and in-
sufficient conflict resolution are likely to lead to reduced
goal progress with regard to the goal at hand, the two
causes may have different antecedents and should be con-
sidered distinct (Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009). In the current
research, we focus on the first step in the model, the iden-
tification of obstacles.
The role of self-awareness in identifying obstacles
What does it take to identify an obstacle? We propose that,
aside from potential situational factors that may affect identi-
fication (e.g. restraining environments like work or public
settings; Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012), on
the basis of their dispositions, some individuals are to more
likely than others to identify obstacles during goal pursuit
and that these are individuals with higher levels of self-
awareness.
Specific definitions of self-awareness vary between the-
oretical contexts (Dewey, 1910; Duval & Wicklund, 1972;
Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Grant, Franklin, &
Langford, 2002; Mezirow, 1990; Trapnell & Campbell,
1999; von Wright, 1992). Duval and Wicklund (1972) were
the first to investigate self-awareness by describing objec-
tive self-awareness as a momentary state of heightened at-
tention on aspects of the self. Further on, Fenigstein,
Scheier, and Buss (1975) pointed out that people also dif-
fered dispositionally in their extent of being the object of
their own attention. They furthermore distinguished the trait
of private self-consciousness (also referred to as
self-focused attention; the tendency to focus on one’s own
feelings, thoughts, and behaviour) from the trait of public
self-consciousness (the tendency to focus on the more visi-
ble aspects of one’s self, like one’s gestures and appear-
ance; Fenigstein et al., 1975). Measures for assessing
private self-consciousness show high test–retest reliabilities
(Fenigstein et al., 1975) and good validity (for an overview,
refer to Smári, Ólason, & Ólafsson, 2008). Private
self-consciousness moreover differs from other conceptuali-
zations of self-awareness that deal, for example, with the
motives that underlie the process of focusing attention to
the self (i.e. rumination about the self following anxiety
vs. reflection due to a stable interest in the self; Trapnell
& Campbell, 1999). The differences in these conceptualiza-
tions become particularly apparent with regard to their rela-
tion with other personality dimensions: Self-awareness in
the sense of rumination (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) is
conceptualized as a facet of neuroticism in the NEO-PI-R
(Costa & McCrae, 1992), but self-awareness in the sense
of private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975)
shows moderate associations with openness to experience
and conscientiousness (Panah & Seif, 2014). More interest-
ingly, although all conceptualizations of self-awareness dif-
fer in their theoretical accentuation, their measurement
instruments are highly correlated (DaSilveira, DeSouza, &
Gomes, 2015) as they all measure the extent that an indi-
vidual pays attention to aspect of the self. In sum, self-
awareness is a multifaceted and differently named construct
that encompasses both dispositional (depending on author
group called private self-consciousness, self-focused atten-
tion, reflection, or metacognitive self-reflection) and situa-
tional forms (called objective self-awareness). For the sake
of simplicity, we decided to use in our research the broader
term self-awareness and distinguish findings on
inter-individual differences from findings on intra-
individual differences by referring to dispositional or
situational self-awareness, respectively.
Regardless of its specific conceptualization, the impor-
tance of self-awareness in goal striving has already been em-
phasized (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Carver & Scheier, 1998;
Donovan, Güss, & Naslund, 2015; Grant, Franklin, &
Langford, 2002). Most crucially for our current argument,
early work (e.g. Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994;
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) proposed
theoretically that a chronic or momentary state of heightened
self-awareness leads people not only to be conscious of their
thoughts, feelings, and behaviour but also to be more aware
of their own goals (or so-called ideal state). Consequently,
self-aware people are more inclined to compare those ideal
states with their momentary, actual states within the goal
striving process. Hence, being engaged in this comparison
process, or so-called goal monitoring, motivates people to
achieve conformity between those different states and there-
fore increases task focus, which has been shown empirically
(Carver & Scheier, 1998). Thus, self-awareness ‘should pro-
mote closer self-regulation to the person’s reference value’
(Carver & Scheier, 1998, p. 34).
Owing to this goal monitoring process, self-awareness
differs from other well-researched constructs, that also focus
on awareness, for example, mindfulness and self-monitoring.
Mindfulness involves a different quality of awareness, which
is non-judgmental and non-discursive and does not necessar-
ily lead to goal monitoring but rather an acceptance of what-
ever is observed (for an overview, refer to Evans, Baer, &
Segerstrom, 2009). Furthermore, self-monitoring character-
izes individual differences in the monitoring of public ap-
pearances in the sense of a higher willingness to modify
expressive behaviour to fit a given situation (Snyder, 1974)
rather than the monitoring of private aspects as inner
thoughts, feelings, and goal-related behaviour (e.g.
Fenigstein et al., 1975).
The importance of goal monitoring is, in fact, stressed in
various theoretical approaches (Carver & Scheier, 1982;
Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Kluger & DeNisi, 1998; Latham
& Locke, 1991; Lewin, 1951; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram,
1960). If one’s own goal striving process is evaluated
through goal monitoring, potential discrepancies between
one’s actual state and one’s ideal state can be possibly de-
tected. And detecting these discrepancies may, in turn, lead
to the identification of obstacles as standing in the way of a
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goal that has been set (Oettingen et al., 2009), as a result of
which efforts will be made to reduce the discrepancy. Other-
wise ‘[…] self-regulation failure will become more likely
when people cease to monitor themselves’ (Baumeister,
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994, p. 33).
In sum, considering that self-awareness is closely linked
to goal monitoring, and goal monitoring is the process that
helps individuals to identify obstacles during goal pursuit,
self-awareness should be a predictor of the identification of
goal-related obstacles. This may, in fact, explain why height-
ened self-awareness is also associated with increased goal-
directed effort (Cowden & Meyer-Weitz, 2016), an increased
choice of problem-solving strategies (Burwell & Shirk,
2007), and better goal-related performance (Donovan, Güss,
& Naslund, 2015).
The current research
As self-awareness is associated with increased goal monitor-
ing (Carver & Scheier, 1998), which is a crucial process for
conflict identification, we hypothesized that self-awareness
promotes the identification of goal-related obstacles. In doing
so, we examined the influence of people’s dispositional self-
awareness on the identification of obstacles in personal goal
pursuit (Studies 1 and 2). We furthermore manipulated situ-
ational self-awareness to investigate our hypothesized effect
experimentally (Studies 3 and 4). While showing that the ef-
fect of a (situationally evoked) state on an outcome cannot be
direct evidence for how the (dispositionally stable) trait af-
fects said outcome (Molenaar & Campbell, 2009), it may
nevertheless further our understanding of how intra-
individual processes, like the evocation of personality states,
might mediate the effects of inter-individual differences on
outcomes. Correlations and hierarchical multiple regressions
were assessed using IBM® SPSS® Statistics software
(Version 23). Mediation analyses (Studies 3 and 4) were con-
ducted using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013).
In view of recommendations regarding Open Science
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012), we are reporting
how we determined our sample sizes, all data exclusions (if
any), all manipulations, and all measures in all studies that
we conducted.1 Furthermore, we preregistered our hypothe-
ses, study design, and all the analyses of Study 4, which
can be assessed at https://aspredicted.org/bk6hz.pdf. All
study materials, including the verbatim wording of all major
variables in all studies, are publicly available on the Open
Science Framework (http://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/
XR32F). Unfortunately, the data cannot be made openly ac-
cessible, as our informed consent forms for the studies did
not inform the participants of this possibility. The data are
available on request.
Regarding issues of discriminant validity for disposi-
tional self-awareness, we measured potential third variables
(e.g. mindfulness, openness to experience, and need for
cognition) across the studies. We furthermore assessed
sociodemographic variables (age and sex), but as we did
not find any correlations with our outcome variable across
the studies, we will not include them as covariates. All study
procedures conformed to the requirements of the local re-
search ethics board.
STUDY 1
To investigate the relationship between self-awareness and
the identification of obstacles, we conducted a first correla-
tional study, in which we operationalized the identification
of obstacles in two different ways. We furthermore assessed
several potentially confounding third variables in order to as-
sess the specific influence of self-awareness on the identifica-
tion of obstacles above and beyond.
Method
Participants and procedure
As our research question was novel, we were unable to make
effect size estimations for sample calculations on the basis of
prior data. We therefore started by assuming a small to me-
dium effect of r = .25 (Cohen, 1988), which we wanted to de-
tect with a statistical power of 80% at a .05 criterion of
statistical significance. A G*Power analysis (Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated that a sample size of 123
was required. Participants were recruited for an online survey
through mailing lists and participated in return for course
credit. Our final sample included 123 university undergradu-
ates with a mean age of 23.68 (SD = 7.10, 77% female).
In the survey, participants named one personal goal they
were currently striving for. Afterwards, they were asked
about the obstacles they had already identified regarding this
goal. Finally, our predictor dispositional self-awareness was
assessed. To assess the specific influence of self-awareness
on the identification of obstacles, we moreover measured po-
tentially confounding third variables. We measured mood, as
previous research has shown that mood affects
self-perception (Montgomery, Hodges, & Kaufman, 2004).
Furthermore, we measured the experience of goal-related
conflicts, which has shown to be associated with the identifi-
cation of obstacles (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). Finally,
we assessed traits, which are associated with self-awareness
and might be crucial for the identification of obstacles owing
to its role for self-regulation (conscientiousness, neuroticism,
and openness to experience: for an overview, refer to Hoyle,
2010; rumination: Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, &
Lyubomirsky, 2008). At the end, participants provided some




After reading a description of the goal concept (Brunstein,
1993; Emmons, 1986), participants were asked to name a
personal goal that was very important to them. We explicitly
1A fifth study was conducted with mixed results. Owing to some major
methodological problems with that study, we have reported it in the supple-
mental online materials, which can be found in the Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/xr32f/?view_only=433463e154c84681a02546c1757db38b).
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asked for a goal that they had been pursuing for 4 weeks and
intended to strive towards for another 2 months in the future.
Most of the participants named a goal concerning their stud-
ies (e.g. passing an exam) (n = 71) or a health goal (e.g.
exercising more frequently) (n = 27), and the remaining par-
ticipants listed goals from different areas, for example,
family/friends (e.g. spending more time with other people)
or hobbies (e.g. practising the viola more often).
Dispositional self-awareness
We measured dispositional self-awareness using the 12-item
Self-Reflection subscale of the Self-Reflection and Insight
Scale (Grant et al., 2002). This scale takes into account dif-
ferent aspects of self-awareness, namely, being self-aware
of one’s inner thoughts (e.g. ‘I frequently take time to reflect
on my thoughts’), one’s inner feelings (e.g. ‘I frequently ex-
amine my feelings’), and one’s behaviour (e.g. ‘It is impor-
tant for me to evaluate the things that I do’). All items were
assessed on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6
(strongly agree). The internal reliability of the scale was ex-
cellent (α = .90), and its distribution was relatively normal
(M = 4.68, SD = 0.78).2
Identification of obstacles
We operationalized the identification of past obstacles in per-
sonal goal pursuit in two ways: as an item-based measure and
in a free exploration task. All participants were first intro-
duced to the concept of obstacles as ‘aspects that hinder the
achievement of your goal’ (Oettingen et al., 2009). We used
four items (adapted from Milyavskaya, Inzlicht, Hope, &
Koestner, 2015 and Oettingen et al., 2009) to assess partici-
pants’ tendency to identify obstacles (e.g. ‘Over the past four
weeks, I have encountered obstacles in the pursuit of my per-
sonal goal’) [scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree)]. The internal reliability of the four items was accept-
able (α = .76), and the distribution of their mean scores was
relatively normal (M = 4.89, SD = 1.07).
We then measured the identification of obstacles in a free
exploration task on the basis of Oettingen (1997). Partici-
pants were asked to take at least 2 minutes to think about
their personal goals and to list in a large text box all thoughts
that arose. We wanted to test if participants with higher self-
awareness had already identified more obstacles in their goal
pursuit and would, in turn, report more obstacles in this free
exploration task.
Two raters were instructed to first separate individual
written thoughts from each other and to then determine for
each thought about a personal goal (e.g. preparing for an
exam), whether it dealt with an obstacle (e.g. friend’s birth-
day party the week before the exam), with a goal-related
means (e.g. studying with a group of students), or with po-
tential consequences of goal achievement (e.g. feeling proud
after the exam). While the two raters took the first step of
separating individual thoughts together, the subsequent cod-
ing was performed individually and independently. Both
raters coded each thought. Intraclass correlation estimates
and their 95% confidence intervals were calculated based
on mean ratings (k = 2), absolute agreement, and two-way
mixed-effects models. The intraclass correlation of 0.77 (95
% CI [0.48, 0.88]) for the two raters’ inter-rater reliability in-
dicates good agreement (Koo & Li, 2016), F(122,
122) = 5.72, p < .001. Disagreements between the two raters
were resolved by discussing them and considering the opin-
ion of a third rater.
Participants named 8.26 thoughts on average (SD = 3.41)
about their personal goals, with 2.38 (SD = 2.35) thoughts re-
ferring to obstacles, 2.71 (SD = 2.29) thoughts referring to
goal means, and 2.37 (SD = 2.54) thoughts referring to the
consequences of goal achievement. On average, 0.80
(SD = 1.25) thoughts were not assigned to one of these three
categories. As might be expected, the item-based measure of
obstacles and the number of obstacles reported in the free ex-
ploration task were positively correlated (r = .35, p < .001).
In addition, we explored whether self-awareness was corre-
lated with the use of the first person (e.g. Davis & Brock,
1975), which was also the case in this study (r = .19,
p = .036, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.36]).
Negative mood. We measured participants’ negative mood
over the previous 2 weeks using four items taken from the
German translation of the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and from
Brunstein (1993). Participants were instructed to rate how
often they had experienced the feeling ‘sad’, ‘worried’,
‘frustrated’, or ‘depressed’ on a scale ranging from 1
(never) to 7 (frequently). The internal reliability of the scale
was acceptable (α = .79), and the distribution of
participants’ average scores relatively normal (M = 3.72,
SD = 1.25).
Rumination. The tendency to ruminate in stressful
situations was measured using four items from the
Individual Coping Questionnaire (INCOPE; Bodenmann,
Perrez, Cina, & Widmer, 2002); for example, ‘My thoughts
circle around the event for a long time’. Scales ranged from
1 (never) to 5 (often). The internal reliability of the scale
was questionable (α = .61), and the distribution of
participants’ average scores relatively normal (M = 3.36,
SD = 0.68).
Neuroticism. Neuroticism was measured using the four
items from the German short version of the Big Five
Inventory (BFI-K; Rammstedt & John, 2005); for example,
‘I get nervous and insecure easily’. Scales ranged from 1
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The internal
reliability of the scale was acceptable (α = .79), and the
distribution of participants’ average scores relatively normal
(M = 3.80, SD = 1.04).
Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness was measured
using the four items from the BFI-K (Rammstedt & John,
2005); for example, ‘I complete tasks thoroughly’. Scales
ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
The internal reliability of the scale was acceptable
(α = .73), and the distribution of participants’ average
scores relatively normal (M = 4.07, SD = 0.86).
Openness to experience. Participants’ openness to
experience was measured using the five items from the
2On the basis of recommendations from literature (Field, 2013), we
interpreted the distributions of the study variables on the basis of visual in-
spection using frequency distribution graphs and p-p plots.
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BFI-K (Rammstedt & John, 2005); for example, ‘I have an
active imagination’. Scales ranged from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 6 (strongly agree). The internal reliability of the scale was
acceptable (α = .72), and the distribution of participants’
average scores relatively normal (M = 4.56, SD = 0.91).
Action crisis. The current experience of an action crisis,
that is, being caught in an intra-psychic decisional conflict
between disengagement and further pursuit of a personal
goal, was measured using the six-item Action Crisis Scale
(ACRISS; Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013). The Action
Crisis Scale entails different aspects of the decisional
conflict, for example, conflict (‘I doubt whether I should
continue striving for my goal or disengage from it’) or
implemental disorientation (‘When striving for this goal I
am repeatedly confronted with situations in which I do not
know how to continue’). Scales ranged from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The internal reliability of
the scale was acceptable (α = .78), and the distribution of
participants’ average scores relatively normal (M = 3.41,
SD = 1.16).
Results and brief discussion
Correlations between all the study variables are shown in
Table 1. In line with our hypothesis, the degree of disposi-
tional self-awareness was positively correlated with the
item-based measure of participants’ identification of obsta-
cles (r = .27, p = .003, 95% CI = [0.10, 0.43]).
However, dispositional self-awareness was not signifi-
cantly correlated with the number of reported obstacles in
the free exploration task (r = .15, p = .089, 95% CI = [0.03,
0.32]).3
As a next step, we repeated analyses with the item-based
measure of participants’ identification of obstacles, account-
ing for the potential influence of all covariates. The results
are presented in Table 2. As can be seen, when controlling
for these variables, self-awareness still explained additional
variance in the identification of obstacles.
Finally, as another exploratory step, we repeated the cor-
relation and hierarchical regression analyses for a subsample
of n = 71 participants, all of whom had listed a goal related to
their studies. We did so to account for the influence of goal
content, as goals relating to different areas might conceivably
be accompanied by a smaller or larger number of obstacles.
In this subsample, the two operationalizations were also cor-
related (r = .35, p = .002, 95% CI = [0.13, 0.54]). Again, dis-
positional self-awareness was positively correlated with the
item-based measure of participants’ identification of obsta-
cles (r = .28, p = .019, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.48]), but not with
the number of reported obstacles in the free exploration task
(r = .18, p = .139, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.40]).4 Hierarchical
multiple regression analyses controlling for crucial third var-
iables in this partial sample confirmed the results of the com-
plete sample (Table 2), but self-awareness explained even
more variance in the partial sample.
The results of Study 1 provide first evidence that disposi-
tional self-awareness is associated with the identification of
goal-related obstacles, both in the total sample and in a sub-
sample of participants, all of whom were pursuing the same
type of goal. Even when third variables (e.g. negative mood,
rumination, and neuroticism) were controlled for, disposi-
tional self-awareness accounted for additional variance. How-
ever, the effect of dispositional self-awareness on the number
of reported obstacles in the free exploration task was not
shown. The non-significant findings might be due to two rea-
sons. First, separating the participants’ personal thoughts from
each other turned out to be difficult, as people differed in the
way they described their thoughts (e.g. with the help of key-
words or long sentences). Second, obstacles are mostly sub-
jective (Marguc et al., 2011) and for this reason are rather
difficult to code from the outside.
STUDY 2
As the free exploration task in Study 1 appeared like a rather
unreliable operationalization of the identification of
Table 1. Means (SDs) and zero‐order correlations between the study variables (Study 1)
Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Dispositional self‐awareness 4.68 (0.78) —
2. Identification of obstacles 4.89 (1.07) .27** —
3. Number of reported obstacles 2.38 (2.35) .15 .35*** —
4. Negative mood 3.72 (1.25) .25** .27** .27** —
5. Rumination 3.36 (0.68) .34*** .24** .29** .49*** —
6. Neuroticism 3.80 (1.04) .15 .21* .25** .60*** .60*** —
7. Conscientiousness 4.07 (0.86) .21* −.27** −.05 −.22* .00 −.15 —
8. Openness to experience 4.56 (0.91) .39*** .25** .05 .22* .22* .19* .09 —
9. Action crisis 3.41 (1.16) .02 .57*** .32*** .36*** .28** .31** −.39*** .10
Note: M, means; SD, standard deviation. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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3Furthermore, dispositional self-awareness was not related to the number of
reported goal means (r = .06, p = .483, 95% CI = [0.12, 0.24]) or the num-
ber of reported consequences of goal achievement (r = .02, p = .805, 95%
CI = [0.16, 0.20]).
4Also, in the subsample, dispositional self-awareness was not correlated with
the number of reported goal means (r = .05, p = .661, 95% CI = [0.19,
0.25]) and consequences of goal achievement (r = .02, p = .869, 95%
CI = [0.21, 0.25]). As dispositional self-awareness did not influence the
number of reported goal means and goal consequences, either in the total
or in the subsample, we assume a specific effect of self-awareness on
obstacles.
obstacles, the aim of Study 2 was to use a different
operationalization. We decided to ask participants to list the
obstacles they had experienced in their personal goal pursuit.
We furthermore wanted to replicate the effect of self-
awareness on the item-based measure while controlling for
some potentially confounding third variables.
Method
Participants and procedure
According to a G*Power analysis (Faul et al., 2009), 105
participants were needed to replicate the correlational effect
between dispositional self-awareness and participants’ iden-
tification of obstacles observed in Study 1. To further in-
crease the explanatory power, we recruited as many
participants as possible over a given period of 5 weeks.
In the end, 169 participants (mostly university undergradu-
ates, mean age 24.09, SD = 7.66, 66% female) took part in
this online survey in return for course credit. Participants
were recruited through mailing lists, flyers, and personal in-
vitations issued during Psychology lectures. As in Study 1,
participants first named a personal goal they were currently
striving for. Afterwards, we assessed the obstacles that they
had experienced while goal striving, as well as participants’
dispositional self-awareness. As in Study 1, we measured
traits that are important for self-regulation and, therefore,
we assume for self-awareness and the identification of ob-
stacles (pessimism: Carver & Scheier, 2001; mindfulness:
for an overview, refer to Hoyle, 2010; rumination: Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). We again assessed participants’
experience of an action crisis (Brandstätter & Schüler,
2013) as a potential confounding third variable, which af-
fected the identification of obstacles in Study 1. At the
end of the study, participants provided some




As in Study 1, participants were asked to name a personal
goal that they were currently striving for. One hundred par-
ticipants named a goal concerning their studies; the remain-
ing participants named goals from different content areas,
for example, work, health, or friends/family.
Dispositional self-awareness
Participants completed the same measure of dispositional
self-awareness as in Study 1. The internal reliability of the
scale was excellent (α = .91), and the distribution of partici-
pants’ average scores relatively normal (M = 4.61,
SD = 0.79).
Identification of obstacles
We operationalized the identification of obstacles in two
ways. First, we asked participants to indicate their recent
identification of obstacles in their personal goal pursuit using
the same four items as in Study 1. The reliability of the four
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averages was relatively normal (M = 4.83, SD = 1.04). Our
second operationalization of obstacles was adapted from
Leduc-Cummings, Milyavskaya, and Peetz (2017). In the in-
structions to this free listing task, participants were provided
with an informal definition of what an obstacle is (‘Obstacles
are all things that stand in the way of reaching a goal’,
Oettingen et al., 2009) and were then, in contrast to the free
exploration task in Study 1, explicitly asked to list all the ob-
stacles they had experienced while pursuing their personal
goal so far. Participants had to take at least 1 minute for this
task and were instructed to use a separate empty text box for
each obstacle. Participants named between 0 and 14 obsta-
cles with an average of 5.04 obstacles (SD = 2.38). The dis-
tribution was positively skewed (skewness of 0.93,
SE = 0.19). We therefore used a log transformation to
normalize the distribution, as recommended by Field
(2013) (Mlog = 0.74, SDlog = 0.18, skewnesslog of 0.53, SE-
log = 0.19). The two operationalizations of obstacles were
positively correlated (r = .24, p = .001).
Rumination
Rumination was measured using the same four items as in
Study 1. Again as in Study 1, the internal reliability of the
scale was questionable (α = .68), and the distribution of par-
ticipants’ average scores relatively normal (M = 3.17,
SD = 0.74).
Pessimism
We measured situational pessimism using the three items of
the German form of the Life Orientation Test (LOT-R;
Glaesmer, Hoyer, Klotsche, & Herzberg, 2008); for example,
‘If something can go wrong for me, then it surely will’. The
response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree). The internal reliability of the scale was
questionable (α = .60), and the distribution of participants’
average scores relatively normal (M = 2.46, SD = 0.72).
Action crisis
The current experience of an action crisis was measured
using the same items as in Study 1. The internal reliability
of the scale was acceptable (α = .78), and the distribution
of participants’ average scores relatively normal (M = 3.46,
SD = 1.13).
Mindfulness
Mindfulness was measured using the German version
(Michalak, Heidenreich, Ströhle, & Nachtigall, 2008) of the
15-item Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Brown &
Ryan, 2003). In this scale, participants indicated how often
they experience mindless acting (e.g. ‘I find myself doing
things without paying attention’). Scales ranged from 1 (al-
most never) to 6 (almost always). The internal reliability of
the scale was good (α = .85), and the distribution of partici-
pants’ average scores relatively normal (M = 4.06,
SD = 0.68).
Results and brief discussion
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between all the
study variables. Dispositional self-awareness was positively
correlated with the item-based measure of participants’
identification of obstacles (r = .21, p = .006, 95%
CI = [0.06, 0.35]), confirming our hypothesis and replicat-
ing Study 1. Furthermore, it was positively correlated with
the second operationalization, the number of obstacles
named in the free listing task (r = .19, p = .012, 95%
CI = [0.04, 0.33]).
We again performed hierarchical multiple regression
analyses to account for the influence of potential third vari-
ables like rumination, pessimism, mindfulness, and action
crisis on the item-based measure of participants’ identifica-
tion of obstacles (Table 4) and the number of obstacles in
the free listing task (Table 5). As can be seen, when those co-
variates for the identification of obstacles were considered,
dispositional self-awareness still explained additional vari-
ance in participants’ identification of obstacles, regardless
of its operationalization.
As in Study 1, we furthermore repeated correlation and
hierarchical multiple regression analyses with a subsample
of the n = 100 participants, who had all named a goal con-
nected to their studies. All the results were replicated: in this
subsample, too, dispositional self-awareness was positively
correlated with both the item-based measure of participants’
identification of obstacles (r = .25, p = .013, 95% CI = [0.06,
0.43]) and the number of obstacles reported in the free listing
task (r = .21, p = .034, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.39]). For the results
of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses within the
subsample, refer to Table 4 (for the effect of self-awareness
Table 3. Means (SDs) and zero-order correlations between the study variables (Study 2)
Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Dispositional self-awareness 4.61 (0.79) —
2. Identification of obstacles 4.83 (1.04) .21** —
3. Number of reported obstaclesa 5.04 (2.38) .19* .24** —
4. Rumination 3.17 (0.74) .10 .19* .07 —
5. Pessimism 2.46 (0.72) .07 .31*** .02 .37*** —
6. Action crisis 3.46 (1.13) .10 .49*** .25** .40*** .44*** —
7. Mindfulness 4.06 (0.68) .06 .12 .04 .22** .26** .28**
Note: M, means; SD, standard deviation.
aFor this variable, zero-order correlations are assessed with the log-transformed variable owing to positive skewness (Field, 2013), but the mean (SD) of the non-
transformed variable is presented here. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Table 4. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses predicting identification of obstacles from self-awareness and control variables in the total sample and subsample (Study 2)
Predictor Identification of obstacles
Total sample Subsamplea
B SE B β 95% CI ΔR2 B SE B β 95% CI ΔR2
Step 1 .254*** .320***
Rumination 0.05 0.11 .03 [0.26, 0.16] 0.03 0.13 .03 [0.21, 0.27]
Pessimism 0.19 0.11 .13 [0.04, 0.41] 0.04 0.13 .03 [0.22, 0.31]
Action crisis 0.42 0.07 .46*** [0.28, 0.57] 0.46 0.09 .56*** [0.29, 0.63]
Mindfulness 0.06 0.11 .04 [0.16, 0.27] 0.09 0.13 .06 [0.18, 0.36]
Step 2 .032** .044*
Self-awareness 0.24 0.09 .18** [0.07, 0.42] 0.26 0.10 .21* [0.06, 0.46]
Total R2 .286*** .365***
n 169 100
Note: B, unstandardized coefficient; SE B, standard error of the unstandardized coefficient; β, standardized coefficient; CI, confidence interval; ΔR2, increase in variance explained by the model.
aThe subsample in this study consists of participants who named a personal goal regarding their studies. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 5. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses predicting number of obstacles from self-awareness and control variables in the total sample and subsample (Study 2)
Predictor Number of obstacles
Total sample Subsamplea
B SE B β 95% CI ΔR2 B SE B β 95% CI ΔR2
Step 1 .072** .137**
Rumination 0.00 .02 .01 [0.04, 0.04] 0.00 0.03 .00 [0.05, 0.06]
Pessimism 0.03 0.02 .10 [0.07, 0.02] 0.05 0.03 .21 [0.11, 0.01]
Action crisis 0.05 0.02 .31** [0.02, 0.08] 0.06 0.02 .42** [0.03, 0.10]
Mindfulness 0.01 0.02 .02 [0.04, 0.05] 0.01 0.03 .02 [0.06, 0.05]
Step 2 .026* .039*
Self-awareness 0.04 0.02 .16* [0.01, 0.07] 0.05 0.02 .21* [0.01, 0.09]
Total R2 .098* .176*
n 169 100
Note: B, unstandardized coefficient; SE B, standard error of the unstandardized coefficient; β, standardized coefficient; CI, confidence interval; ΔR2, increase in variance explained by the model.















































on the item-based measure of participants’ identification of
obstacles) and Table 5 (for its effect on the number of obsta-
cles in the free listing task). As in Study 1, it was possible to
replicate the results and self-awareness explained even more
of the variance in the subsample.
In Study 2, we were able to successfully replicate the pos-
itive association between self-awareness and the item-based
measure of participants’ identification of obstacles observed
in Study 1. Additionally, we were able to show this associa-
tion using a different type of operationalization for the iden-
tification of obstacles, namely, the number of obstacles
named by participants when explicitly asked to list all previ-
ously encountered obstacles. Again, dispositional self-
awareness explained additional variance after controlling
for the effects of third variables (e.g. rumination, pessimism,
and action crisis). It was again possible to replicate the results
in a subsample of participants with a goal in the same content
category. However, Studies 1 and 2 provide no evidence for
the causality of the effect, as they are both correlational stud-
ies. Furthermore, we ran both studies with a measure of dis-
positional self-awareness and did not account for state
differences in self-awareness.
STUDY 3
In order to look at whether self-awareness may have a causal
effect on the identification of obstacles, we conducted Study
3 and manipulated situational self-awareness experimentally.
Furthermore, to reduce error variance, we instructed all par-
ticipants to pursue the same goal, namely, to complete a
search task using the Internet (web browser task).
Method
Participants
According to a G*Power analysis (Faul et al., 2009), at
least 215 participants were needed in order to replicate
the effect of r = .19 found in Study 2 in the hypothesized
correlation model with a statistical power of 80%. To in-
crease the power, and in view of available funding, we
aimed to recruit 240 participants from MTurk, an
Internet-based platform that matches ‘workers’ with ‘re-
questers’ to engage in tasks in return for compensation. In
line with best-practice recommendations, the survey was
only available to USA-based workers with an approval rat-
ing of over 90% (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011;
Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013; Mason & Suri,
2012). Two hundred eighty-four participants started the
questionnaire, of which 39 participants terminated early
and did not submit data for any of the main study vari-
ables. The data for one participant, who provided nonsensi-
cal responses when asked to list goal-related obstacles,
were excluded from the analyses. Because four participants
completed the study but were not paid because they sub-
mitted their responses after the predefined 1-hour time
limit, the final sample included 244 participants with a
mean age of 35.03 (SD = 10.26, 53% female) and different
educational backgrounds (22% high school or less; 33%
college; 37% bachelor’s degree; and 8% master’s degree
or more).
Procedure
The current study was designed as an experiment with one
between-subjects factor (increased situational self-awareness
vs. control condition). First, participants received informa-
tion about the purpose and the content of the study. They
then responded to a scale measuring their dispositional self-
awareness. We furthermore assessed participants’ life satis-
faction and current affect. Please note that the results of our
analyses did not change when controlling for these third var-
iables. This is why we present methods and results of these
additional analyses in the supplemental materials on our
OSF account. By random assignment, one half of partici-
pants then received a manipulation intended to increase their
situational self-awareness. We designed this manipulation on
the basis of the elements of self-awareness assessed in the
Self-Reflection subscale of the Self-Reflection and Insight
Scale (Grant et al., 2002), that is, the awareness of one’s
own inner thoughts, feelings, and behaviours. The main in-
struction was: ‘While you work on it [the following task], fo-
cus your attention on what you think, feel, and do’. In
addition, participants who received this manipulation were
reminded to be self-aware before each of the three knowl-
edge questions, using the following instructions: ‘Please con-
tinue to observe yourself while working on this task’. The
other half of participants (control condition) did not undergo
such a manipulation.
To assess the number of obstacles experienced during goal
striving,we then gave all participants a task requiring them to an-
swer three knowledge questions with the help of an Internet
search (the ‘web browser task’; see more detailed information
later). Afterwards, they were asked to report which obstacles
they had experienced while working on this task. At the end of
the study, the situational self-awareness of the participants was
assessed, and participants provided some sociodemographic
background information. Finally, they were debriefed.
Measures
Dispositional self-awareness
Before the manipulation, all participants completed the same
measure of dispositional self-awareness as in Studies 1 and 2
(α = .97). In comparison with Studies 1 and 2, the distribution
of dispositional self-awareness in this study was negatively
skewed (M = 4.43, SD = 1.23, skewness of0.76, SE = 0.16).
To reduce this skewness, we performed data transformation
as recommended in the literature (Field, 2013) (Mlog = 1.42,
SDlog = 0.21, skewnesslog of 0.12, SElog = 0.19).
5
Identification of obstacles
All participants were instructed to pursue the same task goal,
which was to answer three questions with the help of their
5In transforming negatively skewed data, we relied on recommendations
from Field (2013). First, we performed a reverse score transformation in or-
der to reverse the scores. Second, we performed a log transformation in order
to account for the skewness. Third, we reversed the scores back.
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web browser. The questions were taken from Rodon and
Meyer (2012). We chose two difficult questions (‘What pro-
portion of population was jammed by flu during the
2003/2004 winter in France?’ and ‘What are the names of
the first two spaceships that have ventured towards the exter-
nal solar system?’) and one easy question (‘What did the
Moors do to Raymond Lulle in 1315?’). Each question was
presented individually. To make sure that participants would
neither work on the task for too long (because on MTurk, the
approximate study duration has to be revealed at the begin-
ning) nor feel stressed by a time limit, each web browser
question contained the note: ‘It is intended that you work
on this task for just a couple of minutes’. Participants an-
swered 0.78 web browser questions (SD = 0.71) correctly
and did not differ in their performance depending on the
condition, t(242) = 1.37, p = .173, d = 0.17 (Mexp = 0.72,
SD = 0.68; Mcon = 0.84, SD = 0.74).
After answering the three questions, participants were
asked to write down the obstacles they had experienced
while working on the prior task (same operationalization as
in Study 2). Participants named between 0 and 11 obstacles
(M = 3.10, SD = 1.66). As in Study 2, the distribution was
positively skewed (skewness of 1.29, SE = 0.16), and we
used a log transformation to approach a more normal
distribution (Mlog = 0.58, SDlog = 0.17, skewnesslog of
0.24, SElog = 0.16) (Field, 2013).
Situational self-awareness
Situational self-awareness was measured using two items
from the Situational Self-Awareness Scale (Govern &
Marsch, 2001). We chose the two items that assess a person’s
momentary awareness of his or her inner thoughts and feel-
ings (‘Right now, I am aware of my innermost thoughts’
and ‘Right now, I am conscious of my inner feelings’)
(α = .82). All items were assessed on scales ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The distribution
of the mean situational self-awareness scores was relatively
normal (M = 4.85, SD = 1.57). Dispositional self-awareness
and situational self-awareness were highly correlated
(r = .50, p < .001).
Study duration
It is likely that participants who found the task more difficult
(e.g. because they are not as experienced in using web
browsers), experienced and, in turn, reported more obstacles,
irrespective of their self-awareness. Therefore, we entered
study duration as a covariate in all our analyses as a useful
proxy for task difficulty. Study duration was defined as the
time (in minutes) that elapsed between the beginning and
the end of the study participation (M = 15.02, SD = 8.22).
This information was provided by LIMESURVEY, the software
we used to run the study. Participants in the two conditions
did not differ significantly regarding their study duration, t
(242) = 1.73, p = .085, d = 0.22 (Mcon = 15.89, SD = 8.58;
Mexp = 14.07, SD = 7.74).
Further control questions
To account for possible influences of the manipulation in
terms of experiencing the task as being more challenging or
interesting, we considered differences in concentration (‘I
was very focused while completing this study’) and interest
(‘I find this study interesting’) between the two conditions.
In order to obtain evidence for conscientious task processing,
we furthermore assessed the participants’ honesty when an-
swering the questions (‘I answered the questions in this study
honestly’). All control questions were assessed on scales rang-
ing from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Overall,
participants indicated that they were highly concentrated
(M = 6.73, SD = 0.69), had answered very honestly
(M = 6.85, SD = 0.45), and were very interested in this study
(M = 5.97, SD = 1.43). Data showed that participants in the ex-
perimental and control conditions did not differ from each
Figure 1. Mediation model and mega-analysis for Studies 3 and 4. All analyses are controlled for study duration. The coefficients are standardized regression
weights. Coefficients in parentheses represent indirect effects [and confident intervals]. The 95% confidence intervals of the unstandardized indirect effects were
calculated using bootstrapping (5000 samples). The average direct and indirect effects of the mega-analysis with the pooled data of Studies 3 and 4 (n = 894) are
written in italic. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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other with regard to their average concentration, t
(222.71) = 1.26, p = .208, d = 0.16 (Mexp = 6.67, SD = 0.77;
Mcon = 6.78, SD = 0.62),
6 honesty, t(215.08) = 1.34,
p = .181, d = 0.18 (Mexp = 6.81, SD = 0.51; Mcon = 6.89,
SD = 0.38),6 and interest in the study, t(223.22) = 1.89,
p = .060, d = 0.24 (Mexp = 5.79, SD = 1.57; Mcon = 6.13,
SD = 1.27).6
Results and brief discussion
To replicate the effect of Studies 1 and 2, we analysed the
correlation between dispositional self-awareness and the
number of obstacles reported. As before, dispositional self-
awareness was positively correlated with the number of ob-
stacles reported (r = .14, p = .028, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.26]).7
To test whether themanipulation of self-awareness had the
expected positive effect on situational self-awareness, we
compared the experimental and the control condition with an
independent-samples t-test. This manipulation check revealed
that, as intended, participants in the experimental condition re-
ported higher situational self-awareness (Mexp = 5.06,
SD = 1.49) than did participants in the control condition (M-
con = 4.66, SD = 1.61), t(242) = 2.00, p = .047, d = 0.26,
95%CI = [0.79,0.01].8 There was no significant direct ef-
fect of the manipulation on the number of reported obstacles
though, t(242) =0.33, p = .740, d = 0.04, 95% CI = [0.05,
0.04] (Mexp = 3.16, SD = 1.76; Mcon = 3.05, SD = 1.57).
As this result was unexpected, we followed it up with an
additional, exploratory analysis: According to Kenny and
Judd (2014), measures of compliance with an manipulation
can essentially be used as mediator variables. As our measure
of manipulation compliance was situational self-awareness,
we therefore tested whether an increase in situational self-
awareness mediated the effect of our experimental manipula-
tion of self-awareness on the number of obstacles reported af-
ter the web browser task.9 We computed a regression-based
mediator analysis using 5000 bootstraps with the Hayes
(2012, 2013) procedure using the PROCESS macro for SPSS.
The data confirmed the expected mediation model (Figure 1).
The predictor (0: no manipulation; 1: manipulation of situa-
tional self-awareness) had no significant effect on the media-
tor situational self-awareness (a path: β = .13, p = .053). But
note that according to Hayes (2013), it is sufficient for a signif-
icant indirect effect that the a or b path comes close to a signif-
icance level of p = .5. Furthermore, the mediator situational
self-awareness had a statistically significant effect on the de-
pendent variable, that is, the number of obstacles (b path:
β = .13, p = .046). The resulting standardized indirect effect
(a path × b path) was β = .0159. Using bootstrapping proce-
dures, we tested the significance of this indirect effect. Un-
standardized indirect effects were computed for each of
5000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence interval
was computed. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect ef-
fect was 0.0055, and the 95% confidence interval ranged from
0.0001 to 0.0170. Therefore, the indirect effect was statisti-
cally significant.10
In this study, we were again able to replicate the finding
that dispositional self-awareness is correlated with the identi-
fication of goal-related obstacles. Furthermore, we were suc-
cessful in manipulating self-awareness and were able to show
that higher situational self-awareness due to a self-aware-
ness-enhancing manipulation is associated with a higher
identification of goal-related obstacles in a web browser task.
Most importantly, by manipulating self-awareness and dem-
onstrating an indirect effect of our manipulation on the iden-
tification of a larger number of obstacles, through heightened
situational self-awareness, we have obtained first experimen-
tal evidence for our hypothesized effect. In sum, the study
supports the idea that individuals with both higher disposi-
tional and situational self-awareness do, in turn, identify
more obstacles during goal pursuit.
One major limitation of our study is that we did not antic-
ipate in advance that there would be no direct effect of our ma-
nipulation on the identification of obstacles. Only with
hindsight did we decide to test the indirect effect on the basis
of the mediational model, following considerations associated
with manipulation compliance (Kenny & Judd, 2014). Hence,
given that only our post-hoc analyses in Study 3 supported our
mediation model, more statistical evidence for it is needed.
STUDY 4
Study 4 was conducted as a replication study to strengthen
the results of Study 3, especially with regard to the experi-
mental findings. Therefore, we preregistered Study 4 with
the same design as Study 3 to replicate the indirect effect
with a higher statistical power.
Method
Participants
On the basis of Kenny (2017), we expected that we would be
able to replicate the small indirect effect in the hypothesized
mediation model of Study 3 with a statistical power of 80%
at a significance level of 5% using a sample of 647
participants. We therefore requested 650 participants from
MTurk (mean age 37.46, SD = 10.46, 47% female;
6Levene’s test indicated unequal variances, so the degrees of freedom were
adjusted.
7Analyses without study duration did not change the results (r = .14,
p = .035, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.26].)
8Moreover, we checked whether dispositional self-awareness interacted with
the self-awareness-enhancing manipulation predicting situational self-
awareness. Results indicated a positive significant interaction term,ΔR2 = .01,
ΔF(1, 240) = 4.40, b = 1.70, t(240) = 2.10, p = .037, indicating that individ-
uals with higher levels of self-awareness would benefit more from our self-
awareness-enhancing manipulation.
9Based on the common causal-steps approach for investigating mediation
(Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981), mediation analyses require
a significant direct effect. Please note that we rely on literature claiming sev-
eral concerns on this approach and pointing out that the only requirement to
establish mediation should be a significant indirect effect (e.g. Zhao, Lynch,
& Chen, 2010).
10Analyses without study duration as a covariate revealed no significant in-
direct effect (a path: β = .13, p = .047; b path: β = .12, p = .056; standardized
indirect effect: β = .0157; unstandardized indirect effect: B = 0.0055, 95%
CI = [0.0000, 0.0169]).
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educational backgrounds: 24% high school or less, 24% col-
lege, 41% bachelor’s degree, and 11% master’s degree or
more). As in Study 3, the survey was only available to
USA-based workers with an approval rating of over 90%.
We used an exclusion criterion to ensure that the same partic-
ipants from Study 3 did not participate in Study 4.
Procedure and measures
Replication studies should be as close as possible to the orig-
inal study, so that ideally the only difference between the two
studies is the participants (Brandt et al., 2014). Hence, we
conducted an exact replica of Study 3 with the same proce-
dure and the same measures. Before running the study, we
furthermore submitted a time-stamped preregistration
(https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ym7ku7).
The distribution of situational self-awareness in this study
was relatively normal (M = 4.85, SD = 1.53, α = .82). As in
Study 3, we used a (preregistered) data transformation to ac-
count for the negative skewness in the distribution of disposi-
tional self-awareness (M = 4.40, SD = 1.20, skewness of
0.81, SE = 0.10, Mlog = 1.41, SDlog = 0.20, skewnesslog of
0.11, SElog = 0.10, α = .96) (Field, 2013).
11 Again, disposi-
tional self-awareness and situational self-awareness were
highly correlated (r = .53, p < .001). As in Studies 2 and 3,
we used a (preregistered) log transformation to allow for the
positive skewness in the distribution of named obstacles
(range 0–15,M=3.50, SD=1.84, skewness of 1.63, SE=0.10,
Mlog = 0.62, SDlog = 0.17, skewnesslog of0.13, SElog = 0.10)
(Field, 2013). As in Study 3, participants were highly concen-
trated while working on the study (M = 6.70, SD = 0.68), very
honest in answering the questions (M = 6.82, SD = 0.50), and
highly interested in the study (M = 5.98, SD = 1.36). In this
study, participants took 16.07 minutes (SD = 8.53) on average
to complete the study and answered 1.05 web browser ques-
tions (SD = 0.62) correctly. The two experimental conditions
did not differ from each other with regard to their average con-
centration, t(648) = 0.70, p = .487, d = 0.06 (Mexp = 6.68,
SD = 0.73; Mcon = 6.72, SD = 0.64), honesty, t
(647.86) =1.23, p = .219, d = 0.08 (Mexp = 6.84, SD = 0.49;
Mcon = 6.80, SD = 0.51),
6 interest, t(648) = 0.46, p = .648,
d = 0.04 (Mexp = 5.94, SD = 1.37; Mcon = 5.99, SD = 1.35),
study duration, t(648) = 0.89, p = .376, d = 0.07 (M-
exp = 16.37, SD = 8.57; Mcon = 15.78, SD = 8.49), or perfor-
mance, t(645) = 1.27, p = .206, d = 0.10 (Mexp = 1.02,
SD = 0.64; Mcon = 1.08, SD = 0.59).
Results and brief discussion
We were again able to replicate the positive correlation be-
tween dispositional self-awareness and the number of obsta-
cles, r = .12, p = .002, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.20].12
The manipulation check revealed that, as intended, partic-
ipants in the experimental condition reported higher situa-
tional self-awareness (Mexp = 5.11, SD = 1.28) than
participants in the control condition (Mcon = 4.61, SD = 1.69),
t(623.23) = 4.27, p < .001, d = 0.33, 95% CI = [0.73,
0.27].13
This time, we also found the significant direct effect of
the manipulation on the number of obstacles, t
(648) = 2.75, p = .006, d = 0.22, 95% CI = [0.06,
0.01]. As expected, participants in the experimental condi-
tion reported more obstacles (Mexp = 3.69, SD = 1.80) than
did participants in the control condition (Mcon = 3.33,
SD = 1.87).
To test for the indirect effect, we again computed a
(preregistered) regression-based mediator analysis using
5000 bootstraps with the Hayes (2012, 2013) procedure to
replicate the mediation hypothesis from Study 3. The predic-
tor (0: no manipulation; 1: manipulation of self-awareness)
had a significant effect on the mediator situational self-
awareness (a path: β = .16, p < .001). However, the mediator
had no significant effect on the dependent variable, the num-
ber of obstacles (β = .08, p = .057). Note again that only ap-
proaching significance with the a or b path is not a problem
for demonstrating a significant indirect effect (Hayes,
2013). Using bootstrapping procedures, we tested the signif-
icance of the standardized indirect effect, which was
β = .0121. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect
was B = 0.0041, 95% CI = [0.0005, 0.0093]. We were there-
fore able to replicate the statistically significant indirect ef-
fect of the hypothesized mediation model (Figure 1).14
In Study 4, we again replicated both the hypothesized
correlational effect of dispositional self-awareness on the
number of reported obstacles and the mediation hypothesis,
according to which higher situational self-awareness due to
a self-awareness-enhancing manipulation leads to a higher
identification of goal-related obstacles. Potentially owing to
a larger power as a consequence of the bigger sample, we
were also able to show a significant direct effect of the ma-
nipulation on the number of reported obstacles.
Internal mini meta-analyses and mega-analyses of all
studies
In order to assess the overall strength of our hypothesized
effect, we conducted further analyses with our findings on
dispositional and situational self-awareness. First, we meta-
analysed our studies by assessing the overall mean
11As in Study 3, we first performed a reverse score transformation and then a
log transformation on the negatively skewed data and finally reversed the
scores back (Field, 2013). We preregistered this transformation by using
the term ‘reverse score transformation’ without explicating the concrete three
steps, as they are explained in the literature we rely on (Field, 2013).
12Please note that we preregistered study duration as a control variable for
this analysis but preregistered Pearson correlation rather than specifying par-
tial Pearson correlation as a statistical analysis technique. Of course, we cal-
culated analyses with the control variable with partial Pearson correlations
and analyses without control variables with zero-order Pearson correlations.
As in Study 3, analyses that did not take into account the study duration did
not change the results (r = .13, p = .001, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.20]).
13We again checked whether dispositional self-awareness interacted with the
self-awareness-enhancing manipulation predicting situational self-
awareness. Results indicated no significant interaction term, ΔR2 = .00, ΔF
(1, 646) = 3.72, b = 0.96, t(646) = 1.93, p = .054.
14Mediational analyses without study duration as a covariate did not change
the results (a path: β = .16, p < .001; b path: β = .09, p = .029; standardized
indirect effect: β = .0141; unstandardized indirect effect: B = 0.0048, 95%
CI = [0.010, 0.103]).
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correlation of dispositional self-awareness and the identifica-
tion of obstacles. We conducted separate meta-analyses with
and without Study 5, a study we have decided to move to the
supplemental online materials owing to some major
methodological problems. Furthermore, we conducted
meta-analyses for both operationalizations of identifying ob-
stacles: the item-based measure (Studies 1, 2, and 5) and the
free listing task (Studies 2, 3, and 4). We separated those
operationalizations, as using different measures of the same
study for meta-analysing would give this study more weight
than the other studies. In conducting meta-analyses, we
followed recommendations from the literature (Goh, Hall,
& Rosenthal, 2016). All single correlation coefficients were
Fisher’s z transformed for the analyses and weighted by sam-
ple size. As can be seen in Table 6, these analyses revealed
an average effect size of r = .24 for the association of dispo-
sitional self-awareness and the identification of obstacles
assessed using the four items. The overall effect of disposi-
tional self-awareness on the number of reported obstacles
in the free listing task was smaller, at r = .14. This effect size
dropped sharply owing the smaller effect sizes that we ob-
served in the two correlational studies. Furthermore, the
mean correlation of dispositional self-awareness and both
operationalizations of obstacle identification did not change
when Study 5 was considered.
Following the suggestions of a reviewer, we additionally
conducted a mega-analysis by data pooling to obtain an aver-
age effect of the experimental manipulation on the identifica-
tion of obstacles. Figure 1 shows that the average indirect
effect of the experimental manipulation on the identification
of obstacles via situational self-awareness remains signifi-
cant, when analysing the effect with the pooled data of both
datasets (n = 894), B = 0.0047, 95% CI = [0.0015, 0.0092].
Furthermore, data of this mega-analysis revealed an average
significant direct effect of the experimental manipulation on
the identification of obstacles, β = .07, p = .033. In sum,
these meta-analyses and mega-analyses revealed a significant
link between both dispositional and experimentally induced
self-awareness and the identification of obstacles.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In pursuing their personal goals, people now and then come
across obstacles that may hinder the successful attainment of
those goals. Overcoming obstacles requires the use of self-
regulatory strategies (Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009) but first, and
even more importantly, the identification of an obstacle as an in-
terfering force (Higgins, 2006; Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009).
Identifying an obstacle as standing in the way of a set goal re-
quires self-awareness (Carver & Scheier, 1998). This is because
paying attention to aspects of the self, like one’s own goals, pro-
motes the process of comparing ideal states with actual states in
goal striving. In this research, we highlight the importance of in-
dividual differences for investigating self-regulatory processes
by addressing the role of self-awareness for the identification
of goal-related obstacles. Furthermore, we took a combined ap-
proach of assessing both inter-individual and intra-individual
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an outcome cannot be direct evidence of how the trait affects this
outcome (Molenaar & Campbell, 2009), but it contributes to our
understanding of how intra-individual processes might mediate
the effects of inter-individual differences on outcomes.
In Study 1, participants with higher dispositional self-
awareness reported a higher tendency to identify obstacles
regarding their personal goals. In Study 2, we were able to
replicate this finding. In addition, participants with higher
dispositional self-awareness reported more obstacles in a free
listing task. In both studies, we were able to show that dispo-
sitional self-awareness was associated with the identification
of obstacles even controlling for additional predictors that
might be related to the identification of obstacles during goal
pursuit (e.g. negative mood, action crisis, and pessimism) or
to self-awareness itself (e.g. mindfulness, rumination, neurot-
icism, conscientiousness, and openness to experience). To
account for goal content, we replicated the results with a
(more homogenous) subsample of participants, all of whom
were pursuing a goal related to their studies.
To obtain experimental evidence for the effect of self-
awareness on the identification of obstacles, we then con-
ducted Studies 3 and 4 as experimental studies. In Study 3,
we experimentally manipulated situational self-awareness
and were able to show that an increase in situational self-
awareness increased the number of reported obstacles during
the pursuit of a goal, in this case the task of answering three
questions with the help of a web browser. We replicated this
finding in Study 4, which had higher statistical power and
was preregistered. We furthermore found causal evidence
for the effect by showing a significant direct effect of the
self-awareness-enhancing manipulation on the identification
of obstacles. Please note that we found the hypothesized ef-
fect to be larger in Study 4 than in Study 3. As Study 4
was an exact replication of Study 3 with a bigger sample size
and therefore a more precise estimation of parameters, it is
possible that the indirect effect was underestimated in Study
3. In these experimental studies, we were furthermore able to
replicate the correlational effect of dispositional self-
awareness and the identification of obstacles already found
in Studies 1 and 2. Additionally, we conducted meta-
analyses to assess the overall strength of the hypothesized ef-
fect, even taking into consideration the additional Study 5,
which produced mixed findings and is reported in the supple-
mental materials owing to methodological problems. These
meta-analyses supported the robustness of the association be-
tween dispositional self-awareness and the identification of
obstacles. Lastly, we conducted a mega-analysis in order to
assess an average effect of experimentally induced situa-
tional self-awareness on the identification of obstacles, which
was again significant. Considering those meta-analyses and
mega-analyses, the data from these studies provide strong ev-
idence that self-awareness is associated with the identifica-
tion of obstacles.
Theoretical implications
The findings of this research will be informative regarding
the effects of individual differences on self-regulation. While
commonly studied self-regulatory traits like
conscientiousness, trait self-control, or grit have previously
been looked at predictors of self-regulatory outcomes
(Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007; Moffitt
et al., 2011; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004), less at-
tention has been devoted to understanding the processes that
link self-regulatory traits to self-regulatory outcomes (Hoyle,
2010). In our research, we highlight the importance of indi-
vidual differences in self-awareness, which have been shown
to play a key role in self-regulation (Baumeister et al., 1994;
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) for
predicting such self-regulatory processes, and in turn, self-
regulatory outcomes.
Moreover, our research contributes to an ongoing debate
on the merits of narrow, lower-order personality traits (i.e.
facets of the Big Five) in contrast to broader, higher-order
personality traits (e.g. the Big Five) (Paunonen & Ashton,
2001). In the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992), self-
awareness in the sense of rumination (Trapnell & Campbell,
1999) is conceptualized as a facet of neuroticism. On the
contrary, self-awareness in the sense of private self-
consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Grant et al., 2002)
is associated with openness to experience and conscientious-
ness (Panah & Seif, 2014). Accordingly, we found a zero re-
lationship between dispositional self-awareness and
neuroticism but a positive connection to openness to experi-
ence and conscientiousness in our data (Study 1). Most im-
portantly, we were able to show the incremental validity of
self-awareness when predicting the identification of obstacles
above and beyond these global traits (neuroticism; Costa &
McCrae, 1992; openness to experience, conscientiousness,
Panah & Seif, 2014) and above and beyond a similar, narrow
trait with conceptual overlap (mindfulness, Evans, Baer, &
Segerstrom, 2009). These findings suggest that considering
individual facets of personality allows for a more fine-
grained analysis of personality processes (Paunonen &
Ashton, 2001). Thus, future research should focus more on
the meaningfulness of individual facets of personality. For
example, Grant et al. (2002) suggested to differentiate be-
tween a more adaptive solution-focused self-reflection, in
which individuals reflect on how to reach their goals best,
and a more maladaptive self-focused self-reflection whereby
individuals attempt more to understand their negative emo-
tional, cognitive, and behavioural reactions. It could be as-
sumed that both of these facets of self-awareness are
associated with an increased identification of obstacles, but
that the obstacles they identify differ in their nature (e.g. con-
tent or severity). Future research should investigate the role
of these facets of self-awareness for the identification of ob-
stacles in goal pursuit.
Is identifying more obstacles adaptive?
At the outset, we stressed the important role of obstacle iden-
tification for goal attainment. If individuals identify obstacles
as standing in the way of a set goal, they then can respond ac-
cordingly, for example, by identifying compensatory means
for dealing with the obstacle (Carver & Scheier, 1998;
Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009; Oettingen, 1997).
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It is certainly true that identifying obstacles that require
compensatory action is, overall, an adaptive process. How-
ever, the current research furnished no direct evidence that
an increase in the identification of obstacles does indeed fos-
ter eventual goal attainment. As we did not find any differ-
ences in performance between the experimental and control
groups in Studies 3 and 4, it seems that the identification of
obstacles neither impairs nor promotes goal performance in
the short term.
However, in the long run, the identification of obstacles
could impact goal performance in quite different ways. On
the one hand, individuals who constantly identify a large
number of obstacles may actually be overwhelmed by this
experience and therefore be at a disadvantage. They may
come to feel that they are less competent or less in control
of their goal pursuit or that the expectancy of eventually
attaining the goal is too low to justify investing further effort
(Oettingen, 2000). These subjective experiences may foster
the maladaptive side of self-awareness, which is rumination,
and therefore the experience of an action crisis during goal
pursuit (Brandstätter & Schüler, 2013; Lyubomirsky &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), or could even hinder disengage-
ment from unattainable goals (van Randenborgh, Hüffmeier,
LeMoult, & Joormann, 2010).
On the other hand, individuals who do not acknowledge
the presence of real obstacles are certainly not well equipped
for goal attainment either, as they lack the possibility of
adapting their behaviour when necessary. Next to identifying
real obstacles, another crucial process for self-regulation is
the anticipation of future obstacles (Oettingen, 1997; Zhang
& Fishbach, 2010), because anticipated obstacles are per-
ceived as being more controllable than past obstacles
(Leduc-Cummings et al., 2017). For example, without the
anticipation of obstacles, individuals are unable to capitalize
on counteractive self-control strategies, like increased effort
(Fishbach & Trope, 2005; Zhang & Fishbach, 2010), or to
begin focusing on the more controllable aspects of the situa-
tion (Ferrante, Girotto, Stragà, & Walsh, 2013). Hence, fu-
ture research should investigate whether self-awareness also
leads to a higher anticipation of obstacles.
Ideally, individuals should be well calibrated in their sen-
sitivity to what constitutes an actual obstacle that requires be-
havioural adaptation. They should not see obstacles where
there are none, but they should acknowledge the presence
of obstacle that matter. To get a better grasp of what ‘well
calibrated’ means, future research could experimentally vary
the presence of actual obstacles in a laboratory task and see
how well people with low or higher levels of self-awareness
calibrate their identification of obstacles to their objective
presence. If their identification of obstacles was sensitive to
their objective presence, this would confirm our assumption
that self-awareness promotes goal striving through the iden-
tification of obstacles.
What else can be monitored?
In this research, we focused on goal monitoring as an un-
derlying process of the relationship between self-awareness
and the identification of goal-related obstacles. Research
has shown that monitoring progress is a fundamental self-
regulatory skill (Hoyle & Gallagher, 2015; Inzlicht,
Legault, & Teper, 2014) and promotes task performance
(Oaten & Cheng, 2007) and hence that insufficient goal
monitoring leads to self-regulatory deficits (Baumeister
et al., 1994). In Studies 1 and 2, we assessed obstacles in
personal goal pursuit, the identification of which presum-
ably was based on an individual’s usual monitoring pro-
cess. In Studies 3 and 4, however, we assessed obstacles
in the pursuit of an experimental goal unfamiliar to partic-
ipants, in which individuals could therefore not rely on
their experience in monitoring goal pursuit. Indeed, results
of meta-analyses and mega-analyses show that the overall
strength of the effect dropped in the experimental studies.
It is very conceivable that the identification of obstacles re-
lies not only on a frequent monitoring of one’s own goal
pursuit but also on the resulting knowledge about personal
goal striving. Self-awareness is associated with greater self-
knowledge (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Trapnell & Campbell,
1999), which is why self-aware people can be assumed to
know more about their goal striving and goal-related as-
pects, that is, obstacles, as a result of goal monitoring. Con-
sequently, self-aware people would report more obstacles to
their personal goal pursuits than while monitoring an in-
duced web browser task.
If goal monitoring promotes knowledge about obstacles,
the question arises if it also promotes knowledge about fa-
cilitators. As research has shown, successful goal pursuit
relies not only on the identification of obstacles but also
on the identification of facilitating aspects, such as suitable
opportunities (Gollwitzer, 1999), resources (Hobfoll, 1989),
or instrumental means (Kruglanski et al., 2002). It could
certainly be the case that self-awareness is also associated
with an improved identification of facilitators of goal pur-
suit, for example, original means that may ultimately help
to circumvent or overcome the obstacles (Marguc, Van
Kleef, & Förster, 2015). Such an association seems likely
given that self-awareness is also associated with adaptive
coping strategies (e.g. problem solving) in contrast to more
maladaptive strategies (e.g. avoidance; Burwell & Shirk,
2007), which might result in the choice of more instrumen-
tal means.
Strengths and limitations
This research has some strengths that should be considered.
An important component of cumulative science is replication
(Asendorpf et al., 2013; Brandt et al., 2014; Jasny, Chin,
Chong, & Vignieri, 2011; Nosek, 2013; Schmidt, 2009). We
successfully replicated the effect of dispositional self-
awareness on the identification of goal-related obstacles of
Study 1 in all other studies. Moreover, for the sake of internal
replication, we quantified the hypothesized effect with differ-
ent measures of the identification of obstacles. Furthermore,
we demonstrated the effect experimentally in Study 3 and rep-
licated it in Study 4, which was preregistered to increase the
transparency, rigour, and reproducibility of our research. Re-
garding constraints of generalizability, we were furthermore
able to show the hypothesized effect in both student samples
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(Studies 1 and 2) and, potentially more diverse (Goodman
et al., 2013), MTurk samples (Studies 3 and 4). Finally, we
meta-analysed and mega-analysed our studies in order to as-
sess an overall effect size of our hypothesized effect.
Nevertheless, this research is not without limitations. First,
participants in the control conditions in Studies 3 and 4 did not
receive any instructions matching the self-awareness instruc-
tions in the experimental conditions. We decided to use such
‘non-active’ control groups because we were concerned about
unpredictable effects caused by alternative instructions. The
lack of an active control group, however, may be problematic
insofar as we cannot exclude that giving participants a second
instruction may have made the web browser task more diffi-
cult. This could, of course, impact the identification of obsta-
cles. We therefore assessed the participants’ study duration
and concentration as useful proxies for task difficulty by sug-
gesting that participants who found the web browser task
more difficult would work longer on it and would report more
concentration as long as the task was perceived as being solv-
able (e.g. Gendolla, Richter, & Silvia, 2008). However, data
revealed that participants did not differ significantly either in
their study duration or in their concentration. We take this as
an indication that the self-awareness-enhancing manipulation
did not impose additional cognitive load in the experimental
condition that might have increased task difficulty. Further-
more, we asked participants about their interest in order to as-
sess whether the self-enhancing manipulation would make the
task more interesting and would therefore increase task moti-
vation. Note, however, that the data for both studies revealed
no differences in interest between the groups. We therefore
conclude that the manipulation had neither a beneficial effect
nor a detrimental effect on the participants’ processing of the
web browser task.
A second limitation lies in the fact that the effects of ex-
perimentally induced situational self-awareness on the iden-
tification of obstacles were much smaller than the effects of
dispositional self-awareness. This discrepancy might be due
to methodological reasons, as our manipulation might have
been too weak to show effects of a similar size. We manip-
ulated self-awareness on the basis of its definition (Grant
et al., 2002) by telling participants in our experimental stud-
ies to put their attention on their thoughts, feelings, and be-
haviour while doing the experimental (web browser) task.
In addition, we reminded participants to be self-aware each
time they started a new of a total of three task questions. In
doing so, we avoided formerly used manipulations of self-
awareness (e.g. mirrors and cameras; for an overview, refer
to Morin, 2011) and tried to induce a situational state,
which is most similar to the way of assessing the trait. As
we found a significant effect on our manipulation check
(which is situational self-awareness measured by a question-
naire; Govern & Marsch, 2001), we conclude that our ma-
nipulation enhances self-awareness as we intended.
However, as participants were working on this experimental
task for a longer time (on average 15 minutes), it could be
that the strength of the manipulation has diminished over
time, which, in turn, resulted in a weaker correlation with
the outcome variable. Hence, it would be fruitful for future
research to either use experimental tasks of a shorter
duration in order to make the manipulation more effective
by assessing its short-time effects on the expected outcome
or to search for alternative ways for manipulating situational
self-awareness.
Finally, all our results rely on self-reported data. Self-
reported data contain several potential sources of bias, such
as selective memory or social desirability (Brenner &
DeLamater, 2016). Selective memory could potentially be
problematic in our studies, as we cannot exclude that partic-
ipants did not remember all the obstacles they experienced.
Note, however, that in Studies 3 and 4, the retrieval interval
between the task and the reporting of obstacles for the task
was short. Social desirability might be a bigger problem in
our studies. As being self-aware might be viewed as a valued
skill, participants might have provided inflated reports of
their own levels of self-awareness. In this case, however,
the distribution of self-awareness would display ceiling ef-
fects. The actual data were normally distributed in Studies
1 and 2 but negatively skewed in the MTurk Studies 3 and
4. It could be that MTurk workers are in fact more self-aware
because they are encouraged more often to think about them-
selves through their regular study participation.
CONCLUSION
The present paper has tested the hypothesis that self-
awareness, the state in which a person becomes the object
of his or her own attention (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), pos-
itively predicts the identification of goal-related obstacles.
Across several studies that both measured dispositional
self-awareness and experimentally manipulated situational
self-awareness and across various operationalizations of the
identification of obstacles, we were able to find converging
evidence for this hypothesis. The effect of dispositional
self-awareness furthermore remained present when control-
ling for additional variables, for example, negative mood, ru-
mination, neuroticism, and action crisis, variables that may
all have an impact on the identification of obstacles. In
sum, this research provides first insights into a person factor
as an antecedent condition that contributes to the identifica-
tion of obstacles, a key element in the self-regulatory pro-
cesses of goal pursuit.
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